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This chapter argues that English and Welsh insolvency law provisions must be perfected so 
that insolvent charities are administered to ensure that general charitable purposes continue 
to be achieved despite technical insolvency. The survival of general charitable purposes 
should usurp all other stakeholder interests, including those of the creditors.  
 
By drawing an analogy between the “rescue culture” in English and Welsh insolvency law and 
the cy-près doctrine in charity law this chapter argues that the administration procedure can 
best achieve the continuation of general charitable purposes. If administration and its use is 
perfected towards this aim using “adapted cy-près” the underlying theoretical underpinnings 










 Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law and Social Justice, University of Liverpool and Academic 
Associate, Exchange Chambers. Email: j.tribe@liverpool.ac.uk. This chapter was originally delivered 
as a paper (Tribe, J. Charities and Insolvency Law: A creditor biased mishmash or a flexible insolvency 
framework that benefits general charitable purposes?. In Society of Legal Scholars 2018 Annual 
Conference: Law in Troubled Times. Queen Mary, University of London). I would like to thank the 
conference attendees for their thoughts on the paper. I would like to thank Professor Debra Morris, 
Professor Warren Barr, Dr. John Picton, Dr. John Wood, Professor Pádraig McAuliffe and Dr. Jennifer 
Sigafoos for their comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this chapter. This chapter is better 
for all their efforts.  Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author alone.  




This chapter examines insolvency regulation as it applies to charities1 and applies a 
rescue culture and communitarianism lens to the law of insolvent charities. The 
chapter develops the scant literature on the subject.2 This dearth of treatment has 
arisen as a result of the borderline nature of charity insolvency sitting as it does 
between two separate and distinct areas of substantive law, namely, insolvency law 
and charity law.3   
 
The application of a rescue and communitarian lens to insolvent charities in this 
chapter contributes a much needed novel perspective drawing across corporate 
rescue culture to the terrain of charities. The social nature of charities makes this a 
particularly fertile terrain for a communitarianism analysis. When an insolvent charity 
fails its remaining asset value is usually made available for the creditors through the 
liquidation procedure. Using administration as a rescue tool facilitates the survival of 
those remaining assets for charitable purposes for which they were given, as opposed 
to a piecemeal distribution amongst creditors and the breakup of the charitable entity. 
The rescue and communitarian approach which is advocated in this chapter benefits 




1 For a discussion of the dearth of statistical data on insolvent charities see: Tribe, J. Charity Insolvency, 
in: Mullen, M (Ed). Tolley’s Insolvency Law. (Vol. 125, pp. C35-1-C35-22). LexisNexis, London, 2019. 
Hereafter Tribe Charity Insolvency. 
2 The most substantial treatment to date has been Yates’ 1999 unpublished Ph.D. thesis and associated 
articles. See: Yates, E. Winding up and insolvency of charities: including rescue mechanisms. 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis) University of Liverpool, Liverpool, 1999. See also: Pearce, R & Barr, W. 
Pearce & Stevens’ Trusts and Equitable Obligations. 7th Ed. OUP, Oxford, 2018, p.430 (Hereafter 
Pearce & Barr). The Law Commission have also recently touched on some aspects of charity insolvency 
in their 2017 report Technical Issues in Charity Law, Law Commission No. 375 (2017) in Chapter 12: 
Charity and trustee insolvency. Hereafter Law Commission Technical Issues. See also the brief: 
Framjee, P. British Charities and Insolvency (2009-2010) 12 Int'l J. Not-for-Profit L. 78. 
3 For example, one of the leading texts on charity law, Tudor on Charities, (See further: Henderson, W 
& Fowles, J & Smith, J. Tudor on Charities. 10th Ed. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 2015, para. 21-041 
– Hereafter Tudor Charities) notes “A full discussion of those provisions [the Insolvency Act 1986] is 
beyond the scope of this work, and the reader is referred to standard works on corporate insolvency…” 
A perusal of the leading texts on corporate insolvency (cited below) show that there is relatively scant 
treatment of insolvent charities.  
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Recent high profile news reports and reported cases,4 have brought the issue of 
insolvent charities to the fore. The Kids’ Company,5  the Wedgwood Museum Trust,6 
Age Concern Barking & Dagenham7 and the Work Foundation8 have all recently 
passed into various insolvency procedures. These high profile cases highlight how 
insolvent charities have been regulated over time and how different stakeholder 
interests are treated in charity insolvencies. The respective rights of debtors and 
creditors conflict in a unique manner in this area as the charitable purposes that the 
charity was created to achieve still potentially exist despite the insolvency. These 
charitable purposes can be considered as unique as no superior moral priority interest 
equivalent usually exists in an insolvency. This additional and complicating factor is 
discussed, particularly in the context of keeping this charitable purpose alive, whether 
that be through the imaginative use of an insolvency procedure such as administration 
to “rescue”9 the charitable purpose for communitarianism objectives, or by using an 
adapted version of the long held doctrine of cy-près which may be deployed to help 
safeguard the charity’s assets for the benefit of the charitable purposes (to the 
exclusion of other interests such as creditors).10  
 
The continued application of the funds for charitable purposes is in line with the idea 
that English and Welsh law treats any donation to charity as a charitable gift to be 
applied for charitable purposes generally, not just for the specific purpose that they 
were given. As Barr and Pearce observe: “charitable trusts…have a public 
 
4 See further Tribe Charity Insolvency. 
5 On the causes of the collapse of Kids’ Company see: House of Commons Public Administration and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Collapse pf Kids Company: Lessons for Charity Trustees, 
Professional Firms, the Charity Commission and Whitehall. Fourth Report of the Session 2015-2016, 
HC433, 1 February 2016. See also: Parsons, C. Kids Company: risks of insolvency to large charities 
(2016) C.R. & I. 2016, 9(2), 68-69 (Hereafter Parsons Kids). See also: Weakley, K. When the music 
stopped (2015) Charity F, Oct, 12-14. 
6 See: Re Wedgwood Museum Trust Ltd (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 1974 (Ch).   
7 O’Connell, F & Patel, N & Piper, A. Restructuring a charity: as easy as ACBD? (2010) Recovery, Aut, 
30-31. 
8 Whittaker, S. Making it work: a pre-packaged provisional liquidation (2011) C.R. & I,4(1), 22-23. (a 
provisional liquidation of a Royal Charter entity). 
9 On the burgeoning literature on the traditional “rescue culture” in corporate insolvency see: 
McCormack, G. Business restructuring law in Europe: making a fresh start (2017) JCLS, vol.2, pp.167-
202; McCormack, G. Corporate Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2008; Parry, R. Corporate Rescue. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 2008; Belcher, A. 
Corporate Rescue. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 1997. 
10 On cy-près generally see: Pearce & Barr, pp.422-436. See also: Picton, J. Contradiction in the law of 
charitable lapse (2015) Conv. 2015, 6, 480-488. See also: Picton, J. Reforming the prerogative cy-près  
doctrine (2014) Conv, 6, 473-481. See also: Garton, J. Justifying the cy-près  doctrine (2007) 21 Trust 
Law International 134.   
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character…the law regards property given for any specific charitable purpose as given 
not merely to that particular purpose, but dedicated to charity in the general sense.”11 
This is why the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown,12 and latterly the Charity 
Commission,13 have a general responsibility to ensure that charitable trusts are 
properly administered and enforced for their charitable purpose. Charity continuation 
is also in line with recent pronouncements by Lord Hodgson when reviewing the 
Charities Act 2006 and failed appeal funds. These, he opined, should go to charitable 
purposes.14 The concept of paramount (or general) charitable intention also shows a 
pervasive push towards the facilitation of charitable objects.15 Finally, the tax breaks 
upon which much charitable activity are based are provided by the legislature to 
encourage charitable giving.16 The central argument of this chapter, that (near) 
insolvent yet viable charitable companies should be rescued through administration 
using adapted cy-près like techniques, is geared towards these broad charity 
facilitation aims. It is no longer satisfactory that an accident of charity form choice at 
the creation date of the charity can lead to problems on the advent of insolvency, 
particularly where the vast majority of charities are now incorporated. This problem is 
especially acute when it is considered that on liquidation the remaining value in the 
insolvent charity company is distributed to creditors and therefore lost to the charitable 
purposes for which the charity was created and for which funds were originally 
donated.  
 
It is because of the general charitable purpose that it is imperative that insolvency law 
provides a mechanism through which the charitable purpose, or at least the asset 
value, can continue to exist and be applied for charitable purposes. In this sense 
technical insolvency can be seen as a “supervening impracticality”17 for the affected 
charity which insolvency law, and rescue procedures such as the administration 
procedure in particular, can forestall particularly if allied with the cy-près doctrine. 
 
 
11 See further: Pearce & Barr, p.422, who also refer to “’the common pot’ of charity.” (p.357). 
12 See further: Bradshaw v. University College of Wales, Aberystwyth [1987] 3 All  ER 200, 203, per 
Hoffmann, J (as he then was). See also: Attorney-General v. Cocke [1988] Ch.414. 
13 See for example ss13-20 and s.84 Charities Act 2011.  
14 See further: Trusted and Independent: Giving Charity Back to Charities – Review of the Charities Act 
2006 (July 2012), Appendix A, para.4. 
15 See further: Re Lysaght [1966] Ch.191 and Hanbury Equity, para. 15-067. 
16 e.g. Income Tax Act 2007 s.527 and Corporation Tax Act 2010, s.481. 
17 per Roxburgh, J in Re Lucas [1948] Ch 175, 181 (cited in Pearce & Barr, p.422).  
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The rescue culture and cy-près are synonymous in a certain sense in that both exist 
to facilitate survival of a purpose. For a company rescue achieves ongoing activity 
whether that be profit wealth maximisation or the continued existence of a structure 
that facilitates non-charitable purposes. For a charity cy-près helps achieve the 
continuation of charitable purposes18 and in so doing, “increase(s) the resources 
available to the charity sector.”19 This synergy between rescue and cy-près  has not 
been recognised previously in the leading texts on charity law, instead the focus tends 
to be on liquidation and winding up procedures that lead to the striking off or the 
company.20 Language has focused on “termination”21 despite Charity Commission 
guidance to the contrary and the pressing need to rescue charitable purposes which 
this chapter advocates. The re-emphasis towards rescue techniques advocated here 
are important because the social purposes of charities make a rescue approach, 
based on communitarianism objectives, particularly apposite. Ensuring that the 
remaining asset value is rescued for charitable purpose is the apotheosis of the 
insolvency rescue culture approach.   
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In Part One it is argued that communitarianism 
is normatively right for profit-making corporations. Contrary arguments to this 
proposition are outlined and rebutted. Part Two demonstrates that if 
communitarianism is normatively right for profit-making corporations, then there is no 
doubt that it is also normatively right for non-profit corporations. Part Three follows 
through from the first two parts and demonstrates that charitable corporations should 
have an approach grounded in communitarianism applied to them. This approach is 
described as “adapted cy-près”. The rescue culture as it applies to insolvent 
companies and cy-près as it applies to charities is also examined. Communitarianism 
approaches to corporate insolvency law, as a development of pluralism, are unified 
with general charitable purposes. This unification provides a new approach to the 
rescue of insolvent charitable companies.    
 
 
18 We are generally dealing with subsequent failure in this chapter, although initial failure is also 
encountered, especially if the company to whom a gift has been made has already been wound up.  
19 See Hanbury Equity, para.15-066. 
20 Pursuant to s.1012 CA06. 
21 See for example, Tudor Charities, Chapter 21. 
Hart Chapter – John Tribe (ULTIMATE FINAL) 
 6 
A conclusion then follows that argues that insolvency tool rationalisation is needed to: 
(1) ensure that charitable purposes continue notwithstanding technical insolvency and 
claims within that arena; (2) a re-thinking of policy on priority is undertaken that gives 
precedence to the charitable purposes over other claimants in insolvency. This is a 
novel contribution that both exerts an influence on the academic field but also more 
broadly sets the agenda on how insolvent charities should be dealt with by regulators, 
officeholders and stakeholders going forward. Viable insolvent charities will be 
rescued and charitable purposes will be facilitated. Knowledge of how the world of 




(1) Communitarianism and the For Profit Corporation  
 
 
There should be no doubt that communitarianism is normatively right for profit-making 
companies that are insolvent. Some commentators would argue against this 
proposition reflecting the fact that bankruptcy theory sits along a spectrum.22 This 
spectrum commences with law and economics scholars who are focused on creditor 
friendly regimes. For them creditor interests are the sole consideration in the design 
and implementation of a bankruptcy law.23 Jackson and Baird are the main proponents 
of this approach. Their centre-right capitalist philosophy24 epitomised in their creditors’ 
bargain model takes a very narrow view of the way in which a bankruptcy law should 
operate and be formulated. For Jackson and Baird only pre-insolvency creditor-based 
entitlements should be considered. Indeed, for them no other stakeholders have a 
place within insolvency.25 Hiding behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance a hypothetical 
 
22 See further: Tribe, J. Corporate Insolvency Law: Challenging Orthodoxies in Theory, Design and Use. 
Edward Elgar (forthcoming). See also: Finch, V. The Measures of Insolvency Law (1997) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 227-251. 
23 See further: Jackson, TH. Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain 
(1982) The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 91, No. 5, pp. 857-907. See also: Baird, DG & Jackson, TH. 
Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on 
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy (1984) The University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 97-130. See also: Jackson. TH & Scott, RE. On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay 
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain (1989) Virginia Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 2, 
Symposium on the Law and Economics of Bargaining (Mar., 1989), pp. 155-204. 
24 See Flessner Philosophies, p.23. 
25 See further: Jackson, TH. The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass, 1986. See also: Baird, DG. The Uneasy case for Corporate Re-organisation (1986) 
15 Journal of Legal Studies 127. See also: Baird, DG. Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and 
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren (1987) 54 Univ.Chi.L.Rev, p.815. 
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creditor bargains for an outcome that they would most prefer in any future insolvency 
having in mind their ignorant unknowing status of how they may be affected in any 
subsequent insolvency process. They may involve creditors agreeing that they would 
all receive an equal share in any subsequent liquidation type process, or it may involve 
some bargaining which would allow pre-existing proprietary rights to be respected. 
This bargaining activity establishes creditor interests as being paramount. This is 
perhaps unsurprising. There is no place for other stakeholders, for the creditors wider 
stakeholder interests are simply not what a bankruptcy law is for. For them the function 
of bankruptcy law is to operate as a collectivised debt collection device that solely 
benefits creditors. In taking this view Jackson and Baird combat two main issues, 
namely, the race to the bottom and the common pool problem. In the United States 
bankruptcy law is federal and collectivised through, for example, the Chapter 11 
procedure. At State level there can be a race to the bottom, i.e. whichever creditor 
gets to the assets first wins the entirety of assets. Collectivisation removes this 
competition and in so doing makes bankruptcy law both fairer and also potentially less 
costly, at least for those who would receive nothing if last in the race to the assets.  
The common pool problem is related and highlights the problems that arise when 
diverse ownership interests compete for a finite pool of resources. This competition 
can be inefficient and costly. The creditors’ bargain model seeks to alleviate these 
problems by maximising the return to creditors by focusing on pre-insolvency creditor 
proprietary rights. Jackson and Baird’s view of insolvency law does not therefore take 
account of a plurality of interests. The rescue culture and potentially interested 
stakeholders such as employees, directors, family members, the environment, etc, are 
not within their view of what a bankruptcy law should seek to achieve.    
 
Continuing along the theoretical spectrum from Jackson and Baird we then progress 
through to scholars26 who espouse a view that broader interests should be taken into 
account. These interests have very close synergies with Berle & Dodd‘s 1930s 
exchanges on the subject of pluralism when they discussed “For whom are corporate 
 
26 For other contributions to the spectrum see: Korobkin, DR. Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of 
Bankruptcy (1991) Columbia Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 717-789. See also: Schwartz, A. A 
Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy (1998) The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 107, No. 6 (Apr), 
pp. 1807-1851. See also: Mokal, RJ. Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application. OUP, Oxford, 
2005.  
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managers trustees?”27 These wider stakeholders can include the community, and 
even charities.28 This broader approach is represented by the theories promulgated 
by, inter alia, Warren29 and Gross who postulate a pluralistic model of bankruptcy law. 
This “centre left”30 view builds on the ideas that were first contained within the 
American Bankruptcy Act 1938.31 This view of insolvency law places the interests of 
other non-creditor stakeholders who have been impacted by an insolvency as an 
important factor when designing insolvency systems. Creditors are not the only and 
perhaps even paramount parties for the law to consider. Those framing a bankruptcy 
law, it is argued, should take into account a much broader range of stakeholders who 
“have an interest in a business’s continued existence”32, for example, “older 
employees, regular customers, suppliers, the local community, and the public 
interest.”33 This is the view that Warren proselytises but also that which the United 
States Congress specifically enunciated in their policy pronouncements.34 In relation 
to this more expansive view Warren sees bankruptcy as:  
 
 
27 Trustee is used in the American context in Dodd’s article title and Berle’s response. See: Dodd, ME. 
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1932) Harvard Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 7, pp. 1145-
1163. See also: Berle, AA. For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note (1932) Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 45, No. 8, pp. 1365-1372. See also: Katz, WG. Responsibility and the Modern Corporation 
(1960) The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 75-85; Weiner, JL. The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on 
the Concept of the Corporation (1964) Columbia Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 8 (Dec., 1964), pp. 1458-
1467. See also: Hendry, J. Missing the Target: Normative Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate 
Governance Debate (2001) Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 159-176. See also: Pettet, B. 
The Stirring of Corporate Social Conscience: From 'Cakes and Ale' to Community Programmes. Current 
Legal Problems, University College, London. Vol. 50, pages 279-314, 1997. 
28 See further: Prunty, BS. Love and the Business Corporation (1960) Virginia Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 
3, Law and Philanthropy, pp. 467-476 Corporations. Charities. Statute Making Contributions to Charity 
by Corporations Intra Vires (1939) Harvard Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 538-539. See also: 
Werbelow, JM. Corporations: Ultra Vires Acts: Gifts to Educational Institutions (1954) Michigan Law 
Review, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 751-753. See also: Ruder, DS. Public Obligations of Private Corporations 
(1965) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 114, No. 2, pp. 209-229. 
29 See for example, Warren, E. Bankruptcy Policy (1987) The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 
54, No. 3 (Summer, 1987), pp. 775-814. Hereafter Warren Policy. See also: Warren, E & Westbrook, 
JL. Contracting out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention (2005) Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, No. 
4, pp. 1197-1254. See also: Warren, E. Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World (1993) Michigan 
Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, pp. 336-387. 
30 See Flessner Philosophies, p.24. 
31 Interestingly this places the early development of “insolvency pluralism” outcomes in corporate 
bankruptcy in America startlingly close to the development of Berle’s pluralism within general company 
law objectives. On the history of American bankruptcy law policy up until this point see: Coleman, PJ. 
Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900. The 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 1974. See also: Regis-Noel, F. A History of the 
Bankruptcy Law. Chas, H Potter & Co, Washington DC, 1919.   
32 Warren Policy, p.783. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
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“...an attempt to reckon with a debtor’s multiple defaults and to distribute the 
consequences among a number of different actors.”35 
 
So in addition to creditors, bankruptcy law should also take into account the interests 
of, inter alia, and in no specific order: debtors, creditors of all types (e.g. tax, tort), 
employees, the environment, suppliers, and the local community. This is a broad 
panoply of interests but one which reflects the modern world and the business 
environment within which companies exist, be they profit wealth maximising entities 
or charitable companies. To focus purely on creditor interests is naïve and panders 
solely to the banking hegemony.     
 
On the bankruptcy theory spectrum this takes us to the leading exponent of 
communitarianism approaches to bankruptcy law. In her seminal work on bankruptcy 
and communitarianism36 Gross describes a bankruptcy law (to use the American 
parlance of her work) that takes into account far more interests than creditors. She 
advocates that, “community interests must be taken into account in both the corporate 
and personal bankruptcy systems.” She continues, “The application of 
communitarianism concepts to the world of bankruptcy suggests that the welfare of 
the community should be very much a part of corporate bankruptcy.”37 In advocating 
this approach Gross rejects the argument that bankruptcy is not the instrument to deal 
with “employment in the local area.”38 Simultaneously Gross also keeps creditor and 
shareholder interests within her conception of bankruptcy law. Her community 
interests do not “trump other interests.”39 Gross does also not eject economic 
approaches. Instead she advocates for a “more expansive economic model”.40 The 
Gross view is all inclusive. Multiple stakeholders must be considered when framing a 
bankruptcy law. This approach is to be commended as it respects and reflects the 




35 Warren Policy, p.775. 
36 e.g. Gross, K. Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay (1994) 72 Wash 
U.LQ. 1031. Hereafter Gross Community. Expanded in her later work, see: Gross, K. Failure and 
Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System. Yale University Press, Yale, 2009. Hereafter Gross 
Rebalancing. 
37 Gross Community, p.1042.  
38 Aghion, P. et al. Improving Bankruptcy Procedure (1994) 72 Wash U.LQ. 849. 
39 Gross Community, p.1033. 
40 ibid. 
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(2) Communitarianism and Non-profit Corporations  
 
 
The previous section has demonstrated that communitarianism is normatively right for 
profit-making corporations. There is no doubt that it is also normatively right for non-
profit corporations. This is because charities have social purposes which have broad 
support. This makes creditor interests less salient in policy terms. Some might argue 
to the contrary. They might suggest that charities are less significant than for-profits 
and so they do not need a communitarian regime. Or they might argue that charity 
insolvency, and the subsequent use of liquidation, is rare. As consequence there is no 
need for a communitarian regime. Both insights are wrong as the following section 
demonstrates. Before rebutting these points we must demonstrate why a 
communitarianism approach is right for non-profit corporations. 
 
When citing a 1940s farming study Gross concentrates on “quality of community life” 
in an owner managed farming community noting that “Streets, sidewalks, parks, 
schools, and religious and political involvement were all better in the community…”41 
These public concerns are familiar to charity lawyers, although of course if something 
is public it is not necessarily charitable.42 Charity case law abounds on parks,43 
schools,44 religious45 and political activity.46 Indeed, the charitable head of community 
benefit47 is quite close to bankruptcy communitarianism in the sense of objectives. 
Both approaches are grounded in altruistic behaviour. Both demonstrate that human 
nature is not inherently self-interested. Both engender belief in, “the goodness of 
human nature…”48 Etzioni suggests that communitarianism seeks to safeguard and 
 
41 ibid. 
42 See Blair v. Duncan [1902] A.C. 37. See also Re Diplock [1941] Ch. 253 which discussed whether 
benevolence might not be charitable.  
43 Guild v. IRC [1992] 2 A.C. 310. 
44 On education see: Re Mellody [1918] 1 Ch. 228; Re Shaw [1958] 1 All E.R. 245; Re Hopkins [1965] 
Ch. 669; Re Pinion [1965] Ch. 85; Independent Schools Council v. Charity Commission for England 
and Wales [2011] 12 WLUK 67; Abbey, Malvern Wells Ltd v. Minister of Local Government [1951] Ch. 
728. 
45 See further: Neville Estates v. Madden [1962] Ch. 832; Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 
W.L.R. 1565; Varsani v. Jesani [2002] 1 P. & C.R. DG11: IRC v. Baddeley [1955] A.C. 572; Thornton 
v. Howe 54 E.R. 1042; (1862) 31 Beav. 14; United Grand Lodge v. Holborn [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1080. 
46 McGovern v. AG [1982] Ch. 321; R v. Radio Authority, ex parte Bull [1998] Q.B. 294; IRC v. Yorkshire 
Agricultural Society [1928] 1 K.B. 611. 
47 On which see further: Re Robinson [1951] Ch. 198; Re Wedgwood [1915] 1 Ch. 113. 
48 Gross Community, p.1040. 
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enhance society’s well-being.49 This is exactly what charity also seeks to achieve and 
it is why insolvency laws should be refined to help facilitate the general charitable 
objective.  
 
The parallel between this communitarianism reasoning and the social function of 
charities is striking. All that is missing from Gross’ depiction of community are 
approaches that ameliorate the plight of the poor50 and for the encouragement of 
sport.51 But both are of interest to a community, or at least a community that, “seeks 
to make individuals responsible for their community’s well-being”52 i.e. act within a 
communitarianism framework. Furthermore, even employees have fallen within the 
purview of charity law, something that oftentimes struggles to come within some 
scholars’ perception of bankruptcy law, as we have seen.53 Is it tenable that 
bankruptcy law eschews the interests of employees whilst the law of charity embraces 
them?     
 
A broadly conceived bankruptcy law grounded in the communitarianism philosophy 
works towards the same publicly beneficial objectives as charity law. It would be 
indefensible to silo academic progress in the field of corporate communitarianism and 
treat that learning as if it were separate from the charitable sector. We are focused on 
a multiplicity of interests that recognise, as does the law of charity, that bankruptcy, “is 
immensely more complex than simply determining which approach would yield the 
greatest recovery to one segment of society.”54 Charity law and a communitarian 
bankruptcy law are facilitating very similar objectives. Drawing them ever closer 
through adapted cy-près deployment demonstrates how the two approaches are 
natural bedfellows.  
 
 
49 See further: Etzioni, A. The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian 
Agenda. 1993. See also: Frazer, E. The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict. OUP, 
Oxford, 1999. 
50 See further: Re Coulthurst [1951] Ch. 661; Re Sanders [1954] Ch. 265; Re Resch [1969] 1 A.C. 514; 
Re Faraker [1912] 2 Ch. 488. 
51 Re Dupree [1945] Ch. 16. 
52 Gross Community, p.1036. 
53 On employees as recipients of charity see: Re Oppenheim [1951] A.C. 297; Dingle v. Turner [1972] 
A.C. 601. 
54 Gross Community, p.1034. 
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Schermer objects to a communitarian view of bankruptcy for definitional and 
application reasons.55 He notes “The problem is not that community interests cannot 
be identified, but that there are so many potential interests in every bankruptcy.”56 
Having a plethora of interests or broad term of art, i.e. community, does not make 
something impossible. Indeed, public benefit with charity law is routinely adjudicated 
on by the English and Welsh judiciary. 
 
Community interests are difficult to quantify and are therefore excluded from the 
economic approach to bankruptcy. Public benefit within charity law has also been 
notoriously difficult to define, but this has not stopped the courts enforcing charitable 
instruments. Narrowly focused law and economics exponents simply argue that 
bankruptcy law is about creditors’ interests and increasing returns to creditors in the 
most efficient manner possible, meaning that, “community welfare and well-being are 
not appropriate concerns for bankruptcy.”57   
 
Gross’ broad approach is the closest we have to the suggestion of machinery that 
expedites a function or purpose of the juristic person that acknowledges the wider 
society in which that company sits and how that society is impacted by that company, 
be it charitable or profit wealth maximising.  
 
This part of the chapter opened by noting the existence of a possible academic 
position that holds that charities are less significant than for-profits and so they do not 
need a communitarian regime. A possible position was also noted that charity 
insolvency, and the subsequent use of liquidation, is rare and there is no need for a 
communitarian regime. Both points are incorrect. There are numerous charities that 
have many millions of pounds worth of capitalisation, e.g. Oxfam, Save the Children 
International, Cancer Research UK and the National Trust.58 If they run into financial 
difficulties and edge towards failure it is not appropriate to force them to use outmoded 
insolvency approaches, such as liquidation. Where possible the public benefit 
 
55 Schermer, BS. Response to Professor Gross: Taking Community Interests into Account in 
Bankruptcy – a Modern Day Tale of Belling the Cat (1994) 72 Wash U.LQ. 1031. (Hereafter Schermer 
Response). 
56 Schermer Response, p.1051 
57 Gross Community, p.1035. 
58 See further: https://www.ncvo.org.uk/images/documents/policy_and_research/Britains-biggest-
charities-key-features_final.pdf 
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elements of their work must be permitted to survive. As with for profit companies, non-
profit charities should be using the latest techniques in restructuring and insolvency. 
The rescue agenda should be as alive and buoyant in the charity sector as it is in the 
private for profit sector. Indeed, rescue should be more prevalent in charity insolvency 
because of the social and community interests that charities strive to achieve. This 
includes a communitarianism approach through the administration procedure.  
 
The next part of the chapter demonstrates why charity insolvency is, unfortunately, far 
from rare and why new approaches are needed to charity insolvency. To ignore the 
incidence of charity insolvency neglects the important activity of this engine of social 
good. But to compound the neglect by engaging in charity insolvency by adhering to 
narrow liquidation outcomes or a focus on creditor interests, as opposed to broader 
interests, neglects the unique nature of charities and their charitable purposes. This 
chapter doesn’t go so far as to advocate the introduction of a special administration 
regime, which exists for colleges59 and railways,60 but it does call for a sea-change in 
approach as the next section demonstrates.     
 
 
(3) Insolvent Charitable Corporations, Rescue and “adapted Cy-près” 
 
 
Charity law already contains a mechanism that can meet the demand raised in this 
chapter for a communitarian based rescue culture approach to insolvent charities, 
namely, cy-près. An adapted version of cy-près would help facilitate the administration 
of an insolvent charity with rescue aims, most importantly, the survival of the charitable 
purpose of the insolvent charity. This novel idea of adapted cy-près is the main 
contribution of this chapter to the current unsatisfactory position of insolvent charities.      
 
To facilitate the rescue of insolvent charitable corporations they should have available 
“adapted cy-près” through the administration process. This is a perfection and 
 
59 The first education administration order has been made under the Technical and Further Education 
Act 2017 (TAFEA 2017). The Corporation of Hadlow College went into administration in June 2019. 
The TAFEA 2017 special administration regime protects the interests of college students. 
60 See: Railways Act 1993, s.59(1). See also: The Railway Administration Order Rules 2001, 2001 No. 
3352. Railtrack PLC, for example, went in railway administration on the 7th October 2001. 
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adaptation of an existing charity device. This proposal advocates a change in 
approach to the historic position of cy-près, i.e. a device that seeks to serve the 
interests of a single donor. Adapted cy-près seeks to serve the interests of the wider 
community by helping to facilitate the rescue of an insolvent charity. Adapted cy-près 
could be used as part of an insolvency process to ensure that an insolvent charity, that 
is fundamentally viable, is restructured so that the charity is still able to carry out its 
charitable purposes. For example, a charitable company that is used to administer a 
museum, which is part of a wider group of insolvent companies, need not fail with the 
rest of the group of companies if adapted cy-près administration was available. The 
procedure would be used to ensure that the charitable entity was rescued and could 
continue to fulfil the charitable purposes for which it was formed. Before developing 
this point we will examine some foundational points on charity insolvency. These 
demonstrate why adapted cy-près administration is required. 
 
As part of charity trustees continuing fiduciary obligations they are required to monitor 
the financial health of the charity,61 including making decisions on whether or not to 
borrow,62 or on general issues of financial stability. If insolvency becomes an issue63 
trustees have a number of tools to use depending on which legal device has been 
adopted, e.g. liquidation, administration, receivership, company voluntary 
arrangements (CVAs), etc.64 These continuing obligations make the need for adapted 
cy-près to facilitate a rescue administration all the more obvious. These positive 
obligations for trustees to monitor and maintain the financial health of the charity help 
to ensure that the charitable purposes are achieved. Adapted cy-près extends this 
continuation of charitable purposes, as well as attendant financial responsibility, 
through illiquid periods.   
 
61 For a general overview see the Charity Commission’s guidance document: Managing a charity’s 
finances: planning, managing difficulties and insolvency (CC12) June 2010 (Updated January 2016 - 
New format January 2017). Hereafter Charities Commission Insolvency. See further: Yates, E. Winding 
Up and Insolvency of Charities (Including Rescue Mechanisms. Ph.D. thesis, University of Liverpool, 
1999. Summarised in: Yates, E. Winding up charitable companies - special cases? (2000) Insolv. L., 
3(May), 120-125. See also: Yates, E. Problems of winding up charities (2002) C.L. & P.R., 8(1), 53-61. 
For a brief overview of insolvency rules and charities see: Arnott, M & Ransley, L. When charities come 
to grief. (2014) Recovery, Sum, 18-20. See also: Pepper, A & Rumley, J. Restructuring and insolvency 
of charities (2006) Recovery, Win, 30-31. 
62 See further Sims, C. When and how should charities borrow? (2014) T.P.A. & A, 25(4), 46. 
63 Pursuant to the tests contained in s.123 Insolvency Act 1986, on which see: BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Limited and others (Respondents) v. Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL PLC (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 28.  
64 See further Tribe Charity Insolvency. 
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In addition to the insolvency tools that are used in the context of an insolvent charity it 
is important to remind ourselves of the underlying tensions that exist behind the use 
of these tools. In the context of insolvent charities we are dealing with debtors and 
creditors but also with the additional tension of a charitable purpose and money being 
gifted towards facilitating that purpose by donors, not placating creditor interests in 
any subsequent insolvency procedure. This balancing of interests around a finite sum 
is not a new phenomenon generally or within the context of charity insolvency. As 
Jones has noted in the early modern period stage of charity law development, the 
charitable use trumped bankruptcy law’s distributional purposes.  He observed:  
 
“Identifiable property (land or chattels) held to charitable uses by the bankrupt as feoffe 
was not an asset available for distribution amongst his creditors ‘quia nest part de lour 
estate’”65 
 
Whether or not the interests of charity and charitable purposes in particular can now 
usurp the interests of creditors (and other stakeholders) in the battle for value makes 
up the next part of the chapter. 66  
 
 
Why the Cases are Anti-Communitarian 
 
There are a number of conceptually refined cases that explore the position of 
charitable companies that are going through an insolvency procedure and who have 
asset value that could be used in the liquidation to satisfy creditors, or in the 
alternative, to undertake the charitable purposes for which the original gifts were given. 
This question becomes particularly important where the gifts are given for a charitable 
purpose before the company to which they are given goes into an insolvency 
procedure and where the testators die before that insolvency procedure is instigated.  
 
65 Jones, G. History of the Law of Charity 1532-1827. CUP, Cambridge, 1969, p.95. Author’s underlined 
emphasis. (Hereafter Jones Charities) Jones continues, “But if money given to a charitable use were 
lent to one who became bankrupt, the charitable use would rank with other creditors…” This grouping 
together of the charitable use with the general body of creditors seems to indicate that in this instance 
charity law did not trump insolvency law as seems to be the case with quote cited in the body text.  
66 On charities and how they own assets see further: Dawson, I & Alder, J. The nature of the proprietary 
interest of a charitable company or a community interest company in its property (2007) Tru. L.I, 21(1), 
3-16. 
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If that company then goes into administration or liquidation the insolvency practitioner 
will have to determine whether or not the money should be used for: (1) the charitable 
purposes for which the donors gave the money, or (2) be distributed through a 
liquidation to the company’s creditors as part of the general assets of the company. 
Simply put, should an insolvency procedure render gifts to a charitable company 
ineffective? 
 
From a communitarian perspective  we might expect that the money would still be 
used for the charitable purposes for which it was given, as opposed to the position at 
law which is that the money is available to placate the general body of creditors (some 
of whom may of course be charities themselves).  We cannot commune with the dead 
donors to divine their intentions when an insolvency event has intervened after their 
own death and once the company has passed into an insolvency procedure.67 At least 
one judge has noted that it is unlikely that the testator would have wanted their 
donation to be given to the company if they had known of the liquidation68 and another 
has apparently suggested that the donor would certainly not have intended that their 
gift was to be made generally available to creditors.69 However, the plain words of the 
will override these considerations and the court will not speculate about a given 
testator’s intentions. They will interpret and apply the plain words of the testamentary 
document in relation to the gift. Judges have taken the view that cy-près is just about 
doing whatever the donor wants.70 Invariably this intention is to help further charitable 
purposes of a specific charity. So all that adapted cy-près would be doing when 
 
67 This supernatural contact has been tried in the context of private purposes trusts, albeit in an entirely 
fictional, yet enlightening, conversation. See: Sheridan, LA. Power to Appoint for a non-charitable 
purpose: A Duologue or Endacott’s Ghost [1963-64] 13 DePaul L.Rev. 210. 
68 Neuberger, J in Re ARMS (Multiple Sclerosis Research) Ltd [1997] 1 W.L.R. 877 (See below). 
Neuberger, J noted: “…while I have sympathy for the proposition that the testator would not have 
intended the gift to the company to take effect had he known that the company was in insolvent 
liquidation at the date of his death.” (p.883(C)). 
69 Millett, J (as hen then was) was quoted in the liquidator’s affidavit in Re ARMS (Multiple Sclerosis 
Research) Ltd [1997] 1 W.L.R. 877 (at 870(B)) as indicating, “that he was not happy with the possibility 
that future funds given with the intention of being used for charitable purposes might not be so used but 
might be used to pay creditors.” 
70 See for example: Philpott v. Saint George’s Hospital (1859) 27 Beav 107; Re Weir Hospital [1910] 2 
Ch 124; Attorney General v. Sherbourne Grammar School (1854) 18 Beav 256; Re Wilson [1913] 1 Ch 
314. On cy-près and these authorities see further: Picton, J. Charitable Intention in the Cy-Pres Doctrine 
and Related Trust Principles. University of Liverpool Ph.D. thesis (unpublished), Liverpool, 2013.  
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deployed in an insolvent environment, as defined and argued in this chapter, is to also 
further donor intention and charitable purposes.  
 
Here two leading cases are used to bring out the conceptual complexity; Liverpool and 
District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v. Attorney-General71 and Re Wedgwood 
Museum Trust Ltd (in administration)72 highlight the tensions at play between creditors 
and charitable purposes.73 The cases also demonstrate, particularly the Re 
Wedgwood Museum Trust Ltd case, why it is important to rescue a charity for 
communitarian objectives. As we will see creditors were actually the main 
beneficiaries in the case, but the charity was able to continue due to Government 
intervention. If charity insolvency law is used to permit adapted cy-près and a rescue 
through administration, then insolvency law itself will achieve this positive and 
beneficial outcome, namely, the survival of an internationally important porcelain 
collection and pottery museum.   
 
Cy-près is the tool that can be used to ensure that charity is still facilitated despite 
some interruption to the legal form that is administering that charity. Cy-près is an 
incredibly powerful equitable doctrine that allows the court to alter the objects of a 
charity.74 Traditionally, cy-près  has only applied to charitable trusts. More recently the 
doctrine has been extended to companies,75 perhaps as part of a general move away 
from confines such as impossibility and impracticality.76 Furthermore, in this chapter 
we are discussing the spirit of the cy-près doctrine as well as its minutiae. 
Administrative schemes are also of note,77 but we are dealing with entities that have 
gone into an insolvency procedure and which may not survive, particularly if there is 
no viability. This makes the application of an administrative scheme difficult, whereas 
cy-près can look to new entities as part of any rescue attempt. The concept of failure 
is also important to cy-près as without it the doctrine cannot be applied. If the charity 
 
71 [1981] Ch. 193. 
72 [2011] EWHC 3782 (Ch); [2013] B.C.C. 281 (Ch D (Birmingham)). 
73 For further cases see Tribe Charity Insolvency. 
74 See: Garton, J. Justifying the cy-près  doctrine (2007) Tru. L.I. 2007, 21(3), 134-149. 
75 For a recent example see:  Phillips v. The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds [2012] EWHC 618  
(Ch.). 
76 See Pearce & Barr, p.424, citing Re Weir Hospital [1910] 2 Ch.124, and, Report of the Committee on 
the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts (1952) (Cmnd 8710), para.365. (The Nathan 
Committee).  
77 ibid, p.426. 
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is able to continue in some way there is no failure and cy-près  cannot be applied. 
Technical insolvency and subsequent passage into an insolvency procedure is being 
taken as evidence of failure in this chapter.     
 
 
Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart 
 
Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v. Attorney-General78 
concerned a heart disease research and treatment charity that was run through a 
company limited by guarantee, the Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the 
Heart (LDHDH), which was in liquidation. LDHDH’s main activity had been transferred 
to a local National Health Service hospital in 1948 as a result of the National Health 
Service Act 1946. The architect of these reforms, Nye Bevan, echoed the 19th century 
dissatisfaction with charity and philanthropy,79 as opposed to State provision, when in 
1946 he claimed that it was “repugnant in a civilized community for hospitals to have 
to rely upon private charity.”80 He continued, “I have always felt a shudder of repulsion 
when I see nurses and sisters who ought to be at their work … going about the streets 
collecting money for the hospitals”81 
 
The hospital became vested in the Minister of Health in July 1948. The charity’s 
research into causes and cure of heart disease and other ailments continued for a 
short time under the auspices of the Institute of Research for the Prevention of 
Disease. This ceased in or around December 1968. These “research assets” did not 
vest in the Minister. In 1978 the Attorney-General brought a successful winding up 
petition to wind the company up.82 There was a surplus of £14,727 in 1979, 
approximately £70,820.00 in 2019 prices.  
 
Slade, J had to consider was whether the assets of the company should be used: (1) 
in satisfaction of the company’s members, or (2) whether any surplus should be 
 
78 [1981] Ch. 193. See: Dawson, I & Alder, J. The nature of the proprietary interest of a charitable 
company or a community interest company in its property (2007) Tru. L.I, 21(1), 3-16.  
79 On which see further Tribe Charity Insolvency. 
80 Finlayson, 1994, p.272.  
81 ibid.  
82 Pursuant to s.30(1) Charities Act 1960 (as it then was).  
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distributed to an institution or institutions having similar objects to those of the charity, 
i.e. the value should be distributed cy-près? This second destination for the funds 
adhered to a clause in the company’s memorandum of association.   
 
Slade, J held that the company was both the legal and beneficial owner of the assets.83 
Whilst operating as a charity, the company was nevertheless not a trustee over the 
fund.  Therefore on winding up the assets were to be distributed to the company’s 
members pursuant to the relevant statutory provisions.84 Clause 9 of the company’s 
constitution became operative. As the company held the assets for strictly charitable 
purposes pursuant to its constitution a scheme would be directed on the premise that 
the property and funds of the company were applied cy-près. The judge observed: “In 
my judgment, the court, in exercise of its jurisdiction over charities, can and should 
give effect to this provision [clause 9] by directing a cy-près scheme.”85  The case has 
been cited as authority for the proposition that the “court has cy-près jurisdiction on 
winding up.”86 
 
Counsel for the Attorney-General acting on behalf of charity and charitable purpose 
facilitation argued for Clause 9 of the company’s constitution to be operative and for 
the money to be applied cy-près  on the winding up of the company. This was because 
the members of the charity had no interest in its assets. He was successful in part but 
not on the company occupying the position of trustee argument. As part of his 
argument he noted that:  
 
“The Companies Act 1948 does not provide a complete code regulating the affairs and 
assets of a charitable company on its liquidation. It is necessary to examine the 
provisions in the memorandum and the chapters and to the general principles of law 
concerning charitable trusts and their administration by the court.”87 
 
Slade, J’s judgment is a progressive move forwards towards communitarian 
approaches to charity insolvency. In permitting the use of cy-près in an insolvent 
environment, albeit in a liquidation, Slade, J facilitated the continued use of the 
 
83 Following: Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406. 
84 In this instance s.265 Companies Act 1948.  
85 [1981] Ch. 193, per Slade, J at p.215(F). 
86 See: Martin, JE. Hanbury & Martin Modern Equity. 15th Ed. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 1997, p. 
433, citing Companies Act 1985, s.558 (a provision which has now been superseded).  
87 [1981] Ch. 193, p.196(H). 
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remaining asset value in the company for charitable purposes. Indeed, the drafters of 
Clause 9 brought this about through their design of the clause. Slade, J then enabled 
their intentions to be realised. If this approach is scaled up and refined for use in the 
context of a rescue culture led by administration then communitarian objectives can 
be achieved and charitable purposes satisfied despite insolvency. This approach is 
desirable as it ensures the widest number of stakeholders benefit following a charity 
insolvency.  Here we are eschewing the narrow law and economics approach to 
bankruptcy law of Jackson and Baird as discussed above. Instead we are adhering to 
Gross communitarianism in bankruptcy law with its wider stakeholder benefiting 
attributes. In the context of insolvent charities the charitable purposes are the principal 
beneficiaries of this approach.      
 
We have come a long way since 1980 and not necessarily for the better. It could be 
argued that the scales of insolvent charity regulation have rebalanced in another 
direction to such an extent that there is now a confusing morass of provisions that 
apply to an ever increasing array of legal forms. This makes the job of the trustee 
much more complicated than it need be. The multiplicity of insolvency provisions that 
relate to insolvent charities depending on the legal form that has been used to transact 
the charitable activity adds to the burden. It is especially intolerable when considering 
the overarching point of charities and why the State treats them so specially in all these 
other regards, that the form that is chosen at the moment of creation (possibly with 
little thought or knowledge of the complexities) leads to such different insolvency 
outcomes. Some streamlining is in order. One reform suggestion is that one specific 
procedure be applied to all insolvent charities, irrespective of legal form. In this sense 
we would ape the generally applicability of American bankruptcy procedures, such as 
Chapter 11, as greatly simplify the insolvent charity landscape. The superior moral 
priority of the charitable purpose makes for a strong moral argument that there should 
be one approach for all insolvent charities, and it should be adapted cy-près.  
 
 
Re Wedgwood Musuem Trust Ltd 
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Re Wedgwood Museum Trust Ltd (in administration)88 concerned the 2009 insolvency 
of the Wedgwood Group of companies. The group included a trading company (Josiah 
Wedgwood and Sons Ltd) and a museum company (the Wedgewood Museum Trust 
Ltd).89 His Honour Judge Purle QC had to consider whether the museum company 
held property on charitable trust, or if in the alternative, if the company held the gifted 
property for the benefit of the costs, charges and expenses of the administration and 
the liabilities of the museum company to its creditors. £134.7 million pension deficit 
liabilities rested on this question because of s.75 Pension Act 1995, which makes the 
surviving group company liable.  
 
The museum company was incorporated in 1962. The collection was gifted to the 
museum company in 1964. The motivation for this transfer from a trading company 
within the Wedgwood group was to protect the collection from adverse trading 
activities. Presumably this would include ultimately exposure to creditors, particularly 
those of the trading company, but also creditors more generally, including those of the 
museum company. In devising this corporate structure there would be a permanent 
inalienable collection.  As HHJ Purle QC noted the collection, valued between £11.5 
and £18 million, “is a unique collection of pottery and other artefacts and items of 
historical importance built up over many decades…”90  
 
The 1964 deed poll activating the gift did not mention a charitable trust. The museum 
company was identified as the beneficiary. As noted above insolvency occurred in 
2009 and the museum company was placed into administration.  
 
The Attorney-General argued that the museum company held the 1964 gift on 
charitable trust for charitable purposes. The pension fund trustee argued that the 
company owned the collection in law and had done since the 1964 transfer. 
Accordingly, the collection was available for the company’s creditors pursuant to the 
Insolvency legislation.  
 
 
88 Re Wedgwood Museum Trust Ltd (In Administration) [2011] EWHC 3782 (Ch); [2013] B.C.C. 281 
(Ch D (Birmingham)). See: Farlow-King, C. Going to pot? (2015) T.E.L. & T.J, 172(Dec), 12-15. 
89 The Wedgwood family were not strangers to insolvency. See: Tribe, J & Graham, D. Bankruptcy in 
Crisis - a Regency Saga: Part 4 - Basil Montagu (1770-1851) (2009) Insol.Intel, 22(9), pp. 132-140. 
90 [2011] EWHC 3782 (Ch); [2013] B.C.C. 281 (Ch D (Birmingham)), per HHJ Purle QC, paras.2&7. 
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HHJ Purle QC held that the assets were those of the museum company and that they 
were not held on charitable trust. The assets were therefore available for the 
company’s creditors, including the pension fund, across the whole of the Wedgewood 
group of companies. This meant that the museum collection could potentially be 
broken up and sold in order to satisfy the pension deficit. HHJ Purle QC reflected on 
this when he observed:  
 
“This is a sad conclusion for those who are concerned to preserve a collection which 
is…part of our cultural heritage and of immense importance, but it is the combined 
result of the pension protection and insolvency legislation”91 
 
However, there is a counter balancing argument and one to which HHJ Purle QC paid 
heed. He observed, “It is at least a legitimate view that the tragedy that befalls working 
people when their pensions are affected by insolvency is at least as great as the 
tragedy that has befallen, or may now befall, the collection in this case.”92 It is the 
Wedgwood collection, and the benefits it brings for arts, scholarship and wider 
stakeholders, that is the loser. In communitarianism terms the outcome of the decision 
of HHJ Purle QC is problematic with its strict adherence to insolvency distribution 
techniques. Creditors benefit, including pension fund employees, but wider 
stakeholders and indeed the continued existence of the museum as a centre of 
international importance for Wedgwood pottery suffers dramatically. A communitarian 
insolvency law seeking to rescue the charitable entity through administration would 
have engaged prior to the pension deficit issues and would have sought to restructure 






Specific insolvency procedures have qualities that lend themselves to different 
outcomes. As noted above, it is a communitarian axiom in English and Welsh 
corporate insolvency law that rescue is the mantra that should be applied to troubled 
companies. As the above treatment has highlighted there is no reason why this should 
 
91 See: Re Wedgwood Museum Trust Ltd (In Administration) [2011] EWHC 3782 (Ch); [2013] B.C.C. 
281 (Ch D (Birmingham)), per HHJ Purle QC, para.56. 
92 ibid.  
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not be equally true of charitable companies where administration is a relevant 
procedure, i.e. there is viability.  
 
Within the context of insolvent charities there are two major ways forward in terms of 
reform that will potentially benefit the overall coherence of insolvency law policy 
delivery. First, we could maintain the status quo and trust the professionalism of 
Insolvency Practitioners and their professional advisors to handle insolvent charities 
with the appropriate devices. This is the least favoured option. This approach has not 
worked well to date in the context of insolvent charities. Few have been rescued. If we 
do have to focus on the substance of current tools and techniques we may learn from 
Martin’s expansive view of cy-près, where she noted, “A testator should always be 
careful to identify his beneficiary correctly. It is difficult to see why this should 
automatically negative a general charitable intention.”93 It is this facilitative view which 
could enable the funds of an insolvent charity to be applied to general charitable 
purposes instead of creditor claims. This approach is exemplified by Re Finger’s Will 
Trusts where a gift failed, “but was saved from lapse by the finding of a general 
charitable intention, and was accordingly applied cy-près.”94  
 
Alternatively, and as a second and preferred approach, we should instead undertake 
a root and branch reform at the same time as a much wider policy reform is 
undertaken. It is this second route that is being advocated in this chapter. Adapted cy-
près within the context of a rescue culture based on the administration procedure is 
the vehicle to achieve communitarianism objectives.  
 
It is well known that corporate insolvency law treats trusts as separate and distinct 
from the general body of assets.95 Whether this be, for example, a purpose trust96 or 
a resulting trust.97 Why then are charitable trusts treated differently and subsumed into 
the assets of the company? The short answer is that the assets are not held on trust 
 
93 Martin, JE. Hanbury & Martin Modern Equity. 15th Ed. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 1997, p. 435. 
94 ibid, p.434. 
95 See further: Van-Zwieten, para.6-41. 
96 Barclays Bank Ltd v. Quistclose Investments Ltd [1968] UKHL 4, [1970] AC 567. See further, 
Swadling, W (Ed). The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays. Hart, Oxford, 2004. See also: Goodhart, W & 
Jones, G. The Infiltration of Equitable Doctrine into English Commercial Law (1980) MLR, Vol. 43, No. 
5, pp. 489-513. 
97 See: Prest v. Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 2 AC 415. See further: Tribe, J. Who would be a creditor? 
- Prest in the UK Supreme Court and the effect of trusts on insolvency (2013) CR& I, pp. 91-94. 
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per se by the company even though they are held for a charitable purpose. The assets 
form part of the company’s estate pursuant to s.436 Insolvency Act 1986.98 However, 
it is submitted that charitable asset value, whether held on trust by the company or 
not, should be treated as if it were held on trust, thus helping the general push towards 
continued charitable activity advocated in this chapter. If the property is held in this 
way then it is available for charitable use.  
 
If adapted cy-près is used to facilitate the continued existence of the charitable 
purposes through administration, as opposed to asset value distribution to creditors 
via liquidation, then the cy-près criteria contained in s.67 of the Charities Act 2011 may 
in themselves come to be viewed as communitarian in nature, or at least facilitative of 
communitarianism objectives. The “matters” which the court or Charity Commission 
are to consider when formulating a cy-près scheme are:  
 
“(a) the spirit of the original gift, (b) the desirability of securing that the property is 
applied for charitable purposes which are close to the original purposes, and, (c) the 
need for the relevant charity to have purposes which are suitable and effective in the 
light of current social and economic circumstances.”99 
 
It is the last of these “matters” that is closest to communitarian objectives, particularly 
“current social…circumstances”.100 These could include benefiting he multiplicity of 
stakeholders that have been identified in this chapter. In any future reform these social 
circumstances could be clearly enunciated and include the continued existence of 
charitable purposes through an insolvency and administration to benefit wider 
stakeholders. The second s.67(3) Charities Act 2011 “matter” contained in subsection 
(b) and in particular the section of the clause that reads, “securing that the property is 
applied for charitable purposes”101 is the essence of what adapted cy-près is 
attempting achieve in an insolvent environment. Using adapted cy-près in an insolvent 
environment would ensure that the donors’ intentions are carried out and that 
charitable activity is not hampered by the insolvency of the corporate form that is being 
used to administer the charitable purposes. This charitable purpose rescue can 
 
98 Which states: ““property” includes money, goods, things in action, land and every description of 
property wherever situated and also obligations and every description of interest, whether present or 
future or vested or contingent, arising out of, or incidental to, property.” 
99 s.67(3) Charities Act 2011.  
100 s.67(3)(c) Charities Act 2011. 
101 s.67(3)(b) Charities Act 2011.  
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obviously only occur when there is substantial asset value remaining pursuant to the 






The philanthropists of the 19th century recognised a pressing human need that 
required sating. By facilitating the continued activity of charitable companies we will 
continue with the long philanthropic and charitable tradition of “improving society and 
the quality of life for all.”103  
 
In setting out the framework for insolvent charities this chapter has shown that nearly 
the entire corpus of insolvency mechanisms are available to deal with insolvent 
charities. In part this is good as it allows the deployment of rescue mechanisms and 
clearly structured liquidation provisions. But this choice perhaps says more about the 
current state of English and Welsh insolvency law. 
 
If the now insolvent charity had been formed as a trust, as opposed to a company, the 
general charitable purpose would continue as the money wouldn’t be available for the 
general body of creditors. 
 
From the communitarian perspective advanced in this chapter the anomalous position 
between a not-for profit entity and a for profit entity should no longer be countenanced. 
The corporate form should either be withdrawn from use for charities or there should 
be a specific condition within the memorandum of association which stipulates that on 
the advent of insolvency the money will be held for the benefit of the general charitable 
purpose. Creditors have constructive notice of this document, and as with objects 
clauses creditors can take measures to protect themselves when dealing with this 
species of company. The quid pro quo could be an elevation of the standard expected 
of directors in charitable company is to reflect the large amount of asset value that will 
never be available for creditors. It is irretrievably bound to the general charitable 
 
102 Contained in s.123 Insolvency Act 1986. 
103 Rimel Evolving, p.588. 
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purpose. Failure to adhere to higher duties could result in greater contributions from 
unfit charitable company directors. 
 
In the light of the communitarian approach and rescue culture lens applied in this 
chapter, it has been argued that is not satisfactory that insolvent charities are treated 
differently based upon their form. This may be tolerable for for-profit companies, but it 
is not for charities because of the superior moral priority of the charitable purpose. The 
issue has become especially acute as it has become more common for charities to 
take a form that does not offer the protection of rescue culture administration to 
charitable assets.  
 
This chapter has argued for a single treatment for all insolvent charities that use the 
corporate form as their organisational and structural base. That treatment should be a 
communitarian based approach that seeks to satisfy multiple stakeholders and which 
seeks to facilitate the continued existence of the charitable purpose that the insolvent 
charity was created to pursue. Adapted cy-près and the full use of administration as a 
rescue device are the key tools to achieve this objective. This application of 
communitarian principles is superior to narrow liquidation approaches to insolvent 
charities and offers a number of distinct policy advantages not least the continuation 
of charitable purposes for the benefit of numerous stakeholders and society more 
generally.  
